Population viscosity, i.e., low emigration out of the natal deme, leads to high withindeme relatedness, which is beneficial to the evolution of altruistic behavior when social interactions take place among deme-mates. However, a detrimental side-effect of low emigration is the increase in competition among related individuals. The evolution of altruism depends on the balance between these opposite effects. This balance is already known to be affected by details of the life cycle; we show here that it further depends on the fidelity of strategy transmission from parents to their offspring. We consider different life cycles and identify thresholds of parent-offspring strategy transmission inaccuracy, above which higher emigration can increase the frequency of altruists maintained in the population. Predictions were first obtained analytically assuming weak selection and equal deme sizes, then confirmed with stochastic simulations relaxing these assumptions. Contrary to what happens with perfect strategy transmission from parent to offspring, our results show that higher emigration can be favorable to the evolution of altruism.
(0 < ν < 1), and (1a) 
116
We denote by B i = B i (X, δ) the expected number of successful offspring of the indi-117 vidual living at site i ("successful" means alive at the next time step), and by D i = D i (X, δ) 118 the probability that the individual living at site i dies. Both depend on the state of the 119 population X, but also on the way the population is updated from one time step to the 120 next, i.e., on the chosen life cycle (also called updating rule). Because this term appears 121 in our calculations, we also define
ever, we are interested in the actual value of the expected proportion of altruists in the 141 population, not just whether it is higher or lower than the neutral expectation. This is 142 why we are still considering the Moran Birth-Death and Wright-Fisher life cycles in this 143 study.
144

Methods
145
Analytical part
146
The calculation steps to obtain the expected (i.e., long-term) proportion of altruists are 147 given in Appendix B. They go as follows: first, we write an equation for the expected 148 frequency of altruists in the population at time t + 1, conditional on the composition of 149 the population at time t ; we then take the expectation of this quantity and consider large 150 times t . After this, we write a first-order expansion for phenotypic differences δ close to 151 0 (this corresponds to a weak selection approximation).
152
The formula involves quantities that can be identified as neutral probabilities of 153 identity by descent Q i j . These quantities correspond to the probability that individu-154 als living at site i and j share a common ancestor and that no mutation occurred on 155 either lineage since that ancestor, in a model with no selection (δ = 0) and with mutation 156 intensity µ; this is the "mutation definition" of identity by descent (Rousset & Billiard,
For each of the life cycles that we consider, the expected frequency of altruists in the 174 population, E X , can be approximated as
with W as defined in eq. by R, which is relatedness.
187
The parametrization proposed in eq.
(1) allows us to decouple the effects of the two 188 new mutation parameters, ν and µ. The mutation bias ν, which was defined in eq. (1a),
189
does not affect the sign of the second ("deviation") term in eq. (5); it only appears in the 190 ν(1 − ν) product. The mutation intensity µ, however, affects the values of W , Q in and
191
Q out . The presence of µ at the denominator in eq. (5) may look ominous; however, both
192
R and (1 −Q out )/µ have a finite limit when µ → 0.
193
The different terms depend on the chosen life cycle. We first focus on relatedness R. with m and with µ (the mutation bias ν has no effect). The effect of the mutation inten-207 sity µ on relatedness is strongest at low emigration probabilities m. As m increases, the 208 relatedness values for different mutation intensities get closer, until they all hit zero for 
Primary and secondary effects
212
We now turn to the B and −C terms of eq. (5), which also depend on the chosen life cycle.
213
We further decompose these terms into primary (subscript P) and secondary (subscript 
Primary effects correspond to unmediated consequences of interactions (they are in-
). Secondary effects correspond to consequences of interactions mediated
217
Primary effects
219
Primary effects are the same for all the life cycles that we consider:
and they do not depend on the emigration probability m (see Appendix B.2 for details of 221 the calculations).
222
As we have seen above, the relatedness terms R M and R WF decrease with m (keeping figure 1 ). Consequently, if we ignored secondary effects, we would 224 conclude that the expected frequency of altruists in the population E X decreases as 225 the emigration probability m increases. However, secondary effects play a role as well.
226
Secondary effects
227
Secondary effects take competition into account, that is, how the change in the fecun- for all the life cycles that we consider (see Appendix B.2 for details of the calculations).
233
Under the Moran Birth-Death life cycle, both the probability of reproducing and the 234 probability of dying depend on the composition of the population. We obtain the fol-235 lowing secondary effects:
The competitive effects are the same for the Moran Death-Birth and Wright-Fisher 237 life cycles. In both cases, the probabilities of dying are constant, so we can factor (1 − µ) 238 in the equations:
These secondary effects (eq. (8a) and eq. (8b)) remain negative for the range of emi-
240
gration values that we consider (0 < m < 1 − 1/N D ), and increase with m. In other words,
241
the intensity of competition decreases as emigration m increases.
242
While the value of these secondary effects increases with emigration m, relatedness
243
R, by which they are eventually multiplied in eq. (5) 
(recall that N is the total size of the population, N = nN D .) This result is illustrated in 
263
With this life cycle however, the expected frequency of altruists E X remains lower 264 than ν, its value in the absence of selection (i.e., when δ = 0).
265
Moran Death-Birth
266
The relationship between E X and m is a bit more complicated for the Moran Death- 
269
If the benefits b provided by altruists are relatively low (b < c(n + 1)), E X initially in-
270
creases with m provided the mutation probability µ is greater than a threshold value µ DB c 271 given in eq. (10) below; otherwise, when the benefits are high enough, E X initially in-
272
creases with m for any value of µ. Combining these results, we write
When b < c(n +1), the mutation threshold does not depend on the number of demes N D ,
274
but increases with deme size n. In figure 2(a), the parameters are such that µ 
Wright-Fisher
283
Under a Wright-Fisher updating, the expected frequency of altruists in the population
284
reaches an extremum at the highest admissible emigration value
tremum is a maximum when the mutation probability is higher than a threshold value 286 µ WF c given by
and it is a minimum otherwise. With the parameters of figure 2(c), µ WF c = 0.034.
288
With the Wright-Fisher life cycle however, the expected frequency of altruists re-289 mains below its value in the absence of selection, ν.
290
Relaxing key assumptions
291
To derive our analytical results, we had to make a number of simplifying assumptions,
292
such as the fact that selection is weak (δ 1), and the fact that the structure of the pop-
293
ulation is regular (all demes have the same size n). We checked with numerical simula-
294
tions the robustness of our results when these key assumptions are relaxed.
295
Strong selection When selection is strong, the patterns that we identified not only still 296 hold but are even more marked, as shown on figure A1.
297
Heterogeneity in deme sizes To relax the assumption of equal deme sizes, we ran-298 domly drew deme sizes at the beginning of simulations, with sizes ranging from 2 to 6 299 ure A2, the patterns initially obtained with a homogeneous population structure are ro-301 bust when the structure is heterogeneous.
302
No self-replacement For the Moran model, it may seem odd that an offspring can re-303 place its own parent (which can occur since d i i = 0). Figure A3 , plotted with disper-304 sal probabilities preventing immediate replacement of one's own parent (for all sites i , Figure A4 shows that the result still holds when the dispersal and 317 interaction graphs are the same. In this figure indeed, we let a proportion m (equal to 318 the dispersal probability) of interactions occur outside of the deme where the individu-319 als live, and set d self , the probability of self replacement, equal to 0, so that the dispersal 320 and interactions graphs are the same. Our conclusions remain unchanged.
321
Discussion
322
The expected frequency of altruists in a subdivided population can increase 323 with the probability of emigration
324
Assuming that the transmission of a social strategy (being an altruist or a defector) from a 325 parent to its offspring could be imperfect, we found that the expected frequency of altru-
326
ists maintained in a population could increase with the probability m of emigration out tive condition for altruism to be favored is given by
With the Death-Birth life cycle, the C DB /B DB ratio does not change with the mutation 355 probability µ (the (1 − µ) factors simplified out), but the ratio decreases with the emi- relatedness R, so that the curves can cross provided the mutation probability µ is not 368 too high, i.e., that R was not initially too low already. Hence, for no too high mutation 369 intensity, there is a range of emigration values m such that condition (12) is satisfied.
370
The result is due to secondary effects
371
The result, that frequency of altruists can increase with the emigration probability m, 
379
Secondary effects are less straightforward to understand than primary effects, and 380 yet they play a crucial role for social evolution in spatially structured populations. Com-381 petition among relatives is for instance the reason for Taylor (1992b)'s cancellation result.
382
Similarly, the qualitative differences between the Moran Birth-Death and Moran Death-
383
Birth life cycles is explained by the different scales of competition that the two life cycle 384 produce (Grafen & Archetti, 2008; Débarre et al., 2014) . Secondary effects are also behind 385 the evolution of social behaviors such as spite (West & Gardner, 2010 
A Mutation parameters
558
In the main text, we first introduce effective mutation parameters: µ 1→0 , the probabil-559 ity that an altruist has defector offspring, and µ 0→1 , the probability that a defector has 560 altruist offspring. 562 We assume that there is no selection acting (δ = 0), but that there still are two types of 
561
A.1 Expected frequency of altruists at the mutation-drift balance
Let Y be the type of a randomly chosen individual at the next time step, given the fre-568 quency y at the previous time step. This randomly chosen individual is altruist if its par-569 ent was (which happens with probability y) and it did not mutate (probability 1 − µ 1→0 ),
570
or if its parent was not altruist (probability 1 − y), but the offspring mutated into one 571 (probability µ 0→1 ). We obtain
The expected frequency of altruists at the mutation-drift balance, denoted by ν, is found
573
by solving E Y = E Y . We obtain
A.2 Parent-offspring correlation at the mutation drift balance 575 We can then compute the parent-offspring type correlation at the mutation-drift bal-576 ance. First, let us compute the parent-offspring covariance:
Remember that Y and Y are indicator variables and therefore take value in {0, 1}, so
Then, the standard deviations are given by
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Finally, the parent-offspring correlation is given by
using the formulas eq. (A3)-(A5), and replacing ν by its value (mutation-drift equilib-582 rium, eq. (A2)), we obtain
A.3 Redefining the mutation scheme
584
With the new mutation parameters µ and ν, we can describe the mutation scheme dif-
585
ferently.
586
If we denote by X i the type of a given parent, then the expected type of one of its
Replacing µ 1→0 and µ 0→1 by equivalent combinations of µ and ν as defined in eq. (A6)
589
and eq. (A2), i.e.,
then eq. (A7a) becomes
We can redefine the mutation scheme and interpret eq. (A7c) as follows. Parents transmit 592 their strategy to their offspring with probability 1−µ; with probability µ, offspring do not 593 inherit their strategy from their parent but instead get one randomly: with probability ν, 594 they become altruists, with probability 1−ν they become defectors. With this alternative 595 description, we can call "mutants" individuals who have the same type as their parent.
B.1 For a generic life cycle
598
We want to compute the expected proportion of altruists in the population. We represent 599 the state of the population at a given time t using indicator variables X i (t ), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , Moran Birth-Death
Moran Death-Birth 1 (X , δ) ) is the fecundity of the individual living at site i , and d j i is a dispersal probability, given in eq. (2) in the main text.
Since a dead individual is immediately replaced by one new individual (i.e., popula-612 tion size remains constant and equal to N ),
holds for all sites i and all life cycles.
614
The structure of the population is also such that in the absence of selection (δ = 0, so 615 that f i = 1 for all sites 1 ≤ i ≤ N ), all individuals have the same probability of dying and 616 the same probability of having successful offspring (i.e., of having offspring that become 617 adults at the next time step), so that 
623
Given that the population is in state X(t ) at time t , the expected frequency of altruists 624 at time t + 1 is given by
The first term within the brackets corresponds to births of unmutated offspring from 626 parents who are altruists (X i ). The second term corresponds to the survival of altruists.
627
The third term corresponds to the births of mutants who became altruists (which occurs 628 with probability ν), whichever the type of the parent.
629
A lost strategy can always be created again by mutation, so there is no absorbing (2014)). In other words, for large times t , the expected frequency of 632 altruists does not change anymore (of course, realized frequencies keep changing over 633 time). We denote by ξ(X, δ, µ) the probability that the population is in state X, given 634 the strength of selection δ and the mutation probability µ. Taking the expectation of
, we obtain, after reorganizing:
Now, we use the assumption of weak selection (δ 1) and consider the first-order expansion of eq. (A10) for δ close to 0. = 0 since ξ is a probability distribution (so the second term 647 is zero). Eq. (A11) then becomes
where the derivatives are evaluated at δ = 0. For conciseness, we define
a measure of fitness counting offspring only when they are unmutated (in the sense of 650 the alternate mutation scheme described in Appendix A.3). With this, using the expec-651 tation notation, and denoting by E 0 expectations under δ = 0, we can rewrite and reor-652 ganize eq. (A12) as
Now, we use a first time the law of total probabilities, taking individual phenotypes φ k 654 are intermediate variables:
by definition of φ k (φ k = δX k ), and where the derivatives are evaluated for all φ i = 0, 656 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Introducing the notation P i j = E 0 X i X j (expected state of a pair of sites),
We note that
Given that the size of the population is fixed (
and given that the total number of births does not depend on population composition 661 in the life cycles that we consider, we have
Using the decomposition in eq. (A15), which is valid for any population composition,
663
and so in particular for X = 1, eq. (A17a) becomes
So far, we have not used the specificities of the population structure that we consider.
665
First, the population is homogeneous (sensu Taylor et al., 2007a) . Because this popula-666 tion homogeneity, eq. (A17b) is valid for all i (not just their sum). Secondly, we are con-are only three types of individuals: the focal itself (denoted by "•"), n − 1 other individu-669 als in the focal's deme (denoted by "in"), and N − n individuals in other demes (denoted 670 by "out"). With these considerations, eq. (A17b) becomes
(as previously shown by (Rousset & Billiard, 2000, p.817-818)) . Using this island model-672 specific notation, eq. (A16) becomes
Injecting eq. (A17c) into eq. (A16), we obtain
We can also replace the P terms as follows:
In Appendix C.1, using recursions on P i j , we will see that Q i j can be interpreted as a 676 probability of identity by descent, i.e., the probability that the individuals at sites i and j
677
have a common ancestor and that no mutation (using the alternative mutation scheme 678 described in Appendix A.3) has occurred on either lineage since the ancestor. Replacing 679 the P terms with eq. (A19), and noting that Q i i = 1, eq. (A18) becomes
We can further decompose the derivatives, now using the fecundities f as interme-
The term
is the marginal effect of a change in the phenotype of the individual 683 living at site k on the fecundity of the individual living at site . By assumption, social 684 interactions take place within demes only, so whenever sites and k are in different 685 demes, we have
We then need to characterize the effect of one's own 686 phenotype (i.e., k = ) and of another deme-mate's phenotype (k and being different
Eq. (A20) then becomes (using notation • to refer to the focal individual itself, and where 689 W = W i , since the derivatives are the same for all i ):
(As previously, all derivatives are evaluated at δ = 0.)
691
Finally, we write a first-order approximation of the expected frequency of altruists in 692 the population:
The first term, E 0 X , is the expected frequency in the absence of selection; it is equal 694 to ν (as introduced in eq. (A2)). The derivative 
With the Death-Birth life cycle, eq. (5) becomes
With this life cycle, Death occurs first, and the probability of dying is independent from 712 the state of the population (since we assume that social interactions affect fecundity. We Wright-Fisher Under this life cycle, we obtain 
The only -but important -difference between eq. (A30) and eq. (A28) time t , but the site was replaced by an altruist (second and third terms of eq. (A31)):
We take the expectation of this quantity, and consider that the stationary distribution 738 is reached (t → ∞); then E X i X j (t + 1) = E X i X j (t ) , and we obtain after a few lines of 739 algebra:
while P i i = ν.
741
Now we substitute
and we realize that Q i j is the probability that the individuals at sites i and j = i are iden- In a Wright-Fisher model, all individuals are replaced at each time step, so we directly 750 consider the state of the parents:
The first term of eq. (A34) corresponds to both parents being altruists, and having altruist 752 offspring; the second line corresponds to exactly one parent being altruist, and the third 753 line to both parents being non-altruists (in this latter case, the two offspring have to be 754 both mutants to be altruists).
755
Taking the expectation and simplifying, we obtain
Replacing
Again, Q i j corresponds to a probability of identity by descent: the individuals at sites i 
The values of Q in and Q out depend on the type of life cycle that we consider.
765
When the number of demes is infinite, Q in is relatively easily obtained using recur- with N 1 = N D and N 2 = n:
(δ q is equal to 1 when q is equal to 0 modulo the relevant dimension, and to 0 other- 
So forQ, using system (A40) in eq. (A38a),
In particular,
viduals are in the same deme. The two individuals are different when r 2 ≡ 0, and so:
And when r 1 ≡ 0, the two individuals are in different demes:
With with m (see figure A5(a) ).
797
When the mutation probability µ is vanishingly small (µ → 0), both Q 
820
The two probabilities of identity by descent go to 1 when the mutation probability 
